Kimberly Wells v. Retinovitreous Associates Ltd by unknown
2017 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
8-1-2017 
Kimberly Wells v. Retinovitreous Associates Ltd 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2017 
Recommended Citation 
"Kimberly Wells v. Retinovitreous Associates Ltd" (2017). 2017 Decisions. 722. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2017/722 
This August is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2017 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CURCUIT 
________________ 
 
No. 16-2962 
________________ 
 
KIMBERLY WELLS, 
 Appellant 
 
v. 
 
RETINOVITREOUS ASSOCIATES, LTD.  
d/b/a MID ATLANTIC RETINA 
  
________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
 (E.D. Pa. No. 2-15-cv-05675) 
District Judge:  Honorable Juan R. Sánchez 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
February 7, 2017 
 
Before: MCKEE, COWEN, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed: August 1, 2017) 
_______________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge. 
This is an employment retaliation suit. Plaintiff Kimberly Wells previously 
                                                     
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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brought suit against her former employer Retinovitreous Associates, Ltd., alleging 
disability discrimination based on her diagnosis with multiple sclerosis. Now, Wells 
alleges she was disciplined, suspended, and terminated in retaliation for that lawsuit. 
For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the District Court’s order granting 
summary judgement in favor of Wells’ employer. 
I. 
Wells worked as an Ophthalmic Technician for Retinovitreous Associates, Ltd. 
(“RA”) at its Wills Eye Hospital office in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania from August 2011, 
until her termination in July 2015. Wells’ job responsibilities included performing, 
explaining, and documenting certain medical procedures and obtaining and documenting 
patient medical histories and current symptoms. This position was governed by an 
employee handbook, outlining RA’s policies. Violations of these policies, including 
failure to follow a supervisor’s directions, were subject to corrective disciplinary action.1 
In the course of her first three years of employment, Wells received two such 
disciplinary warnings. In March 2012, Wells received a “verbal written warning” for 
failing to document a patient’s injection and failing to return a perishable drug to 
refrigerated storage.2 In January 2013, Wells received a second such warning for 
“unsatisfactory work performance/insubordination” for failing to complete chart 
documentation per her manager’s instructions but telling her manager that the 
documentation was completed.  
                                                     
1 RA’s corrective disciplinary actions included verbal counseling, written warnings, 
suspension with or without pay, demotion, transfer, or termination of employment. 
2 The warning notes the employee’s disagreement with the basis of the infraction.  
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During that time period, Wells also received an overall score of “meets 
expectations” on her 2013 annual employee evaluations; she received a score in the “need 
improvement” range in her 2014 evaluation, including in the teamwork, communication 
skills, and essential abilities categories. 
In January 2013, Wells was diagnosed with multiple sclerosis. Shortly thereafter, 
Wells notified RA of her diagnosis and requested leave under the Family Medical Leave 
Act, which she took intermittently until October 2014. In February 2015, Wells sued RA, 
bringing failure to accommodate, hostile work environment, and retaliation claims related 
to her FMLA leave requests.3 
 Wells received multiple disciplinary infractions following the suit, culminating in 
her termination. A month after bringing this suit, Wells received a “verbal written 
warning” for failing to follow proper inventory management procedures when preparing 
medication for a patient’s injection. Later that month, Wells received a written warning 
for failing to document three injections and discharging a patient without consulting her 
supervisor. Shortly thereafter, in April, Wells received a three-day suspension after 
preparing a patient’s incorrect eye for an injection. Wells received a written warning in 
May for failing to follow proper procedure in signing out a drug and verifying a patient’s 
insurance information.4 Finally, in July 2015, Wells was fired for failing to follow 
                                                     
3 The District Judge presided over Wells’ original suit. The parties agreed to dismiss the 
action with prejudice in September 2015. See Wells v. Retinovitreous Assocs. Ltd., No. 
15-478 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 18, 2015).  
4 The warning noted that Wells stated that the issue was “Billing[’]s problem” and 
indicates that “Kim needs to take ownership and responsibility for her own mistakes.” JA 
290. 
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pharmaceutical inventory management procedures and neglecting to appropriately 
document an injection for billing purposes. 
Wells then filed the suit before us. She alleged that RA retaliated against her for 
her initial lawsuit, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),5 the Family 
and Medical Leave Act (FMLA),6 and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA).7  
RA moved for summary judgment, which the District Court granted.8 The District 
Court found that Wells could not establish a prima facie case of retaliation, because she 
could not show a causal link between the filing of her original suit and subsequent 
adverse employment actions. The District Court further held that even if she had done so, 
she had failed to show that RA’s reasons for the adverse employment actions were 
pretextual. 
This appeal followed. Wells argues the District Court erred in granting summary 
judgment because (1) the District Court applied the improper standard in determining if a 
pattern of discipline following a protected activity rises to the level of a materially 
adverse employment action, and (2) the District Court improperly concluded that Wells 
had not proven causation.9 
                                                     
5 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213. 
6 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654. 
7 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 951-963. 
8 See Wells v. Retinovitreous Assocs., No. 15-5675, 2016 WL 3405457 (Jun. 21, 2016 
E.D. Pa.). 
9 Wells’ Br. at 2. Wells does not press the pretext issue on appeal, but instead addresses 
the issue as part of her argument that she has proven causation. Nevertheless, we will 
construe this argument as challenging the District Court’s determination that she had not 
shown pretext as well. 
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II.10 
Claims of retaliation under the ADA, FMLA, and PHRA are analyzed under the 
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.11 Under this framework, the analysis 
proceeds in three stages: (1) the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of retaliation; 
(2) if the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the defendant must articulate a 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its adverse action against the plaintiff; (3) if the 
defendant does so, the burden then returns to the plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of 
the evidence that the defendant’s proffered reason is a pretext for retaliation.12 “Our 
experience is that most cases turn on the third stage, i.e., can the plaintiff establish 
pretext.”13 
So, too, does the case here. Even assuming Wells could make out a prima facie 
                                                     
10 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over the 
District Court’s grant of summary judgment and apply the same standard that the District 
Court applies. See Shuman ex rel. Shertzer v. Penn Manor Sch. Dist., 422 F.3d 141, 146 
(3d Cir. 2005). A court should grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there 
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “In evaluating the evidence, a court must view the 
facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all inferences in that 
party's favor.” Shuman, 422 F.3d at 146 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
11 See Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep’t., 380 F.3d 751, 759 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(applying McDonnell Douglas framework to ADA retaliation claim); Budhun v. Reading 
Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 765 F.3d 245, 256 (3d Cir. 2014) (applying framework to FMLA 
retaliation claims); Daniels v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 776 F.3d 181, 193 (3d Cir. 2015) 
(applying framework to PHRA retaliation claims). 
12 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-803 (1973); Williams, 380 F.3d 
at 759 n.3. While the burden of production may shift, the burden of persuasion remains at 
all times with the plaintiff. Id. 
13 Jones v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 198 F.3d 403, 410 (3d Cir. 1999). 
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case,14 she has failed to show that RA’s proffered reasons for the adverse employment 
actions are pretextual. To establish pretext, the plaintiff must “either (i) discredit[] the 
proffered reasons, either circumstantially or directly, or (ii) adduc[e] evidence, whether 
circumstantial or direct, that discrimination was more likely than not a motivating or 
determinative cause of the adverse employment action.”15 The employee “must show, not 
merely that the employer's proffered reason was wrong, but that it was so plainly wrong 
that it cannot have been the employer’s real reason.”16  
 Wells argues that it is not believable that, after “not [being] disciplined for 
approximately two . . . years, and . . . [after being] issued positive performance reviews,” 
                                                     
14 To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) she 
engaged in a protected activity, (2) she subsequently or contemporaneously suffered an 
adverse employment action, and (3) there is a causal link between the protected activity 
and the adverse action. See EEOC v. Allstate Ins. Co., 778 F.3d 444, 448-49 (3d Cir. 
2015) (applying the ADA standard); Budhun, 765 F.3d at 256 (applying the FMLA 
standard); Daniels, 776 F.3d at 193 (applying the PHRA standard). The parties do not 
dispute that Wells engaged in protected activity when she filed her prior lawsuit against 
RA or that Wells was subject to adverse employment actions. 
 
     Wells correctly argues that the District Court applied the wrong standard in 
identifying the adverse employment actions she suffered. The District Court should have 
applied the less restrictive Burlington Northern standard, under which “a plaintiff must 
show that a reasonable employee would have found the challenged action materially 
adverse, which in this context means it well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker 
from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. 
Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006) (internal citations and quotations omitted).  
 
     The application of the incorrect standard does not lead us to reverse the District 
Court’s order, however, because applying the correct standard, Wells’ claims still cannot 
survive summary judgment, since Wells has failed to show that RA’s proferred reasons 
for its disciplinary actions were pretextual. For the same reason, we need not address 
Wells’ arguments regarding causation. 
15 Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764 (3d Cir. 1994).  
16 Keller v. Orix Credit All., Inc., 130 F.3d 1101, 1109 (3d Cir. 1997) (en banc). 
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she “suddenly became inept at her job such that she was issued discipline on an almost 
monthly basis following her protected activity.”17 
 However, as the District Court correctly notes, Wells “does not dispute the 
underlying conduct giving rise to [RA]’s warnings and adverse employment actions.”18 In 
reviewing the record, we conclude that the District Court properly found that Wells had 
not shown it was more likely than not that discrimination, rather than this conduct, caused 
the adverse employment actions here.  
The conduct leading to the disciplinary actions included repeated failure to 
document patient medication and follow proper billing and inventory procedures, 
repeated failures to follow the instructions of her supervisors, and preparing a patient’s 
incorrect eye for a procedure.19 Wells was on notice of the potential for dismissal for any 
of the cited infractions pursuant to RA’s established disciplinary procedures,20 and RA 
followed its disciplinary procedure in issuing warnings and suggesting corrective 
measures. Furthermore, prior to Wells’ filing of her initial suit, Wells’ 2013 and 2014 
performance reviews indicated a need to improve in several key areas, including 
monitoring patients, communication skills, and teamwork21 and Wells was subject to two 
disciplinary actions.  Furthermore, Wells offers no evidence that similar violations of her 
employer’s policies did not result in discipline prior to the filing of her suit, and Wells 
                                                     
17 Wells’ Br. at 27. 
18 JA 9. 
19 Wells acknowledged that administering this procedure to a patient’s incorrect eye 
could potentially cause health risks. JA 109. 
20 JA 61. 
21 JA 264-73. 
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offers no comparator evidence from which we can conclude that other employees who 
did not sue RA were treated more favorably for similar disciplinary violations. And the 
billing infractions, which resulted in Wells’ final written warning and her ultimate 
termination,22 were discovered after a routine review of all employee billing work by a 
billing agent, not a targeted search by a supervisor.23 
Thus, no reasonable juror could infer that RA’s non-discriminatory reasons for 
Wells’ disciplinary warnings, suspension, and termination were a pretext based on this 
evidence. 
IV. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s Order granting 
summary judgment to RA. 
                                                     
22 JA 290, 297. 
23 JA 99. 
